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Stealing Time 
The Temporal Regulation of Labor in Neoliberal 
and Post-Fordist Work Regime  
Andrew Stevens and David O. Lavin 
 
The construction, commodification, and regulation of time in 
workplaces should be seen as a political economic process. This 
article examines the emergence of “time theft” as it arose in a 
neoliberal ideological climate.  The rise of time theft as a new 
type of crime against capital is contextualized within organiza-
tional changes that demarcate neoliberal economies, namely the 
emphasis on decentralized, post-Fordist, outsourced, and in-
creasingly competitive labor-market conditions. This paper be-
gins by examining the theoretical elements of time theft and 
moves on to draw from empirical evidence gathered from a case 
study of an outsourced, non-unionized call center in Ontario, 
Canada, and explores how workers’ time is regulated by man-
agement using advanced information and communication tech-
nologies. It concludes that despite the gains made by individual-
ized acts of resistance and informal collective resistance by em-
ployees in call centers which make the working environment 
somewhat tolerable, collective resistance through unionization is 
central to make far-reaching changes in the sector. 
 
T his article explores the emergence of “time theft” as it developed under the auspices of an economic and political project commonly referred to as neoliberalism, and builds upon a seminal article by Laureen Snider that examined “the genealogy of crime creation through an investigation into 
the discovery and management of a new type of crime against capital” (Snider 
2002, 90). As we argue, the construction, commodification, and regulation of time 
in workplaces should be seen as a political economic process. The rise of time theft 
as an emerging type of crime against capital is contextualized within organizational 
changes that demarcate neoliberal economies, namely the emphasis on decentral-
ized, post-Fordist, outsourced, and increasingly competitive labor-market condi-
tions. By looking at industry and media publications from the early 1980s to the 
present, this exegesis will reveal how time theft was, and continues to be, vilified as 
a counterproductive behavior allegedly costing Canadian and American companies 
billions of dollars each year in lost profits and business failures. The first section of 
this article explores the political and theoretical elements of time theft, including its 
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relationship to the political economy of neoliberalism and how it developed within 
the corporate consciousness. Section two deploys the concept by examining how 
time is regulated for disciplinary purposes by management in a Canadian call cen-
ter. 
This investigation used a case study of one non-unionized call center located in 
a mid-sized southern Ontario city (identified throughout this article by the pseudo-
nym OnCall). OnCall is a US-headquartered company that specializes in out-
sourced telecommunication contracts and has eighteen other call centers throughout 
the United States and Canada. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a 
snowball sample of rank-and-file employees between September 2005 and March 
2006. The twelve workers interviewed were Canadians of European descent, half 
were female and half were male, all between the ages of 19 and 40, and their educa-
tional attainment ranged from high school to university. All interviewees have also 
been given pseudonyms to protect their identity since management was not aware 
of the study. In addition, a sample of Canadian and American media and industry 
publications between 1980 and 2006 was used to research the prevalence of time 
theft as a concept in the corporate and public consciousness. 
To be sure, the concept of time theft is not entirely new.  In the early twentieth 
century Frederick Winslow Taylor, referring to it as “systematic soldering,” be-
lieved that this sort of activity constituted “the greatest evil” and was a threat to 
America and its overall productivity (Taylor 1947, 20). Because of this belief, Tay-
lor was determined to eliminate any sort of waste in the labor process. We argue 
that contemporary management theory pertaining to knowledge-based workplaces 
continues to make similar assertions, as management practice remains determined 
to structure the labor process according to scientific principles. While current ap-
proaches to management often deploy more sophisticated strategies—many of 
which have been adapted to advances in information and communication technolo-
gies (ICTs)—the same Taylorist discourse about discipline and revoking worker 
control over labor still appears. In the business press, similar moralistic comments 
as those espoused by Taylor arise, but with an added criminalizing emphasis. 
Our study also reaffirms a number conclusions arrived at in existing literature 
on the call center industry, namely that the work is highly routinized, subject to 
extensive electronic monitoring, acutely stressful and leads to high levels of labor 
turnover as well as physical and psychological health problems (Bain et al. 2002; 
Taylor and Bain 2001; Taylor and Bain 1999; Baldry, Bain, and Taylor 1997). Fur-
thermore, as Zuboff (1984), Garson (1988), and a host of other scholars have 
pointed out, the rise of ICTs in the workplace has resulted in more managerial con-
trol over the labor processes and the workforce itself, rather than realizing the pos-
sibilities for emancipation. For decades, critical surveillance and labor process 
theorists have suggested that management needs a strict regime of surveillance and 
control (Rule 1996; Lyon 1994; Edwards 1979; Braverman 1974). While our re-
search supports the argument that management's power is enhanced by surveillance 
technologies, the model of Foucault's Panopticon utilized by some authors (Fernie 
and Metcalf 1998) to describe call centers inaccurately portrays the management’s 
control over labor as absolute and thus negates the possibility and actuality of resis-
tance. Indeed, as Bain and Taylor (2000) suggest, management would like to wield 
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ultimate control over the labor process, although the actual conditions prove other-
wise. While surveillance remains a key mechanism of control, the workplace is not 
a total institution and workers can and do evade many elements of management’s 
technological gaze. Applying the panopticon to workplaces can become problem-
atic and it must also be stressed that this concept is only one aspect of Foucault’s 
wider theorization on the disciplinary society. Yet even with this in mind one ca-
veat is warranted: formal management policies are not enacted in their entirety at 
all times on the floor. While management’s task is to ensure that employees do 
their assigned work, often through the use of discipline and surveillance, some of 
the actions by workers that may constitute resistance are overlooked by supervisors 
if the outcomes are limited—that is, if they have a negligible impact on overall pro-
ductivity.  Furthermore, as we discovered, a subordinate group may exercise its 
power to resist in some circumstances and not in others, and the very nature of this 
resistance can relate to particular forms of control (see Jermier, Knights, and Nord 
1994).  
Finally, we argue that the rising prevalence of time theft—or rather the identifi-
cation by management of non-productive activities by employees while at work as 
constituting theft—in workplaces loosely categorized as knowledge- or communi-
cation-based is related to the low union density in these sectors. Under Fordist eco-
nomic models, dominated by industrial firms in monopoly capitalism, unions suc-
cessfully bargained for a restricted workday, overtime pay, break-times, paid vaca-
tions, grievance procedures, and in some cases provided workers with a degree of 
control over their work. Without some form of collective representation, the only 
protection that employees in the service sector have is the basic labor laws and 
standards, which most often privilege employers. And while unions are not the only 
response, they cannot be overlooked when examining possible avenues of resis-
tance by labor against management's increasing and technologically facilitated 
scrutiny over the labor process. 
Before we go further with our discussion on time theft, a brief overview of the 
political economy of call centers in North America is necessary. Call centers are 
relatively new and first appeared in the early 1980s in the US. Call centers and call 
center work have experienced rapid expansion in Western countries and increas-
ingly throughout the world, and since the mid 1990s they have received a signifi-
cant amount of academic and media attention (Bain et. al, 2002). With the conver-
gence of computing and telecommunications technologies, falling communication 
costs, and liberalized national telecommunications policies, corporations can easily 
relocate service work to call centers almost anywhere in the world. The growth of 
the call center sector is also linked to the increasing tendency of corporations to 
outsource or offshore services, such as technical help, billing inquires, and cus-
tomer complaints, allowing corporations to realize substantial savings in labor 
costs. It is particularly important to note NAFTA and other international trade 
agreements, as these are some of the mechanisms through which US-based corpora-
tions facilitate the offshoring—or nearshoring in the case of Canada—of call cen-
ters. This is part of the larger business-led process of North American continental 
integration and economic globalization. These undemocratically reached agree-
ments, such as NAFTA, guarantee transnational corporations, among other things, 
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unrestricted flows of information, both data and voice, through the communication 
networks of Mexico, Canada, and the US (Levy 2005; Mosco 2005; Rideout 2003; 
Schiller and Mosco, 2001). 
Call centers are seen by many at all levels of government as sources of eco-
nomic stimulation and growth, particularly in regions of higher unemployment 
rates, which has resulted in fierce competition to attract these businesses. Because 
of this, both regional (that is, provincial, municipal, etc.) and national governments 
are compelled to offer corporate welfare in the form of tax abatements or reform 
labor regulations in the interest of business. Relatedly, many local economic devel-
opment corporations and provincial governments purposely note the low union-
density rates within the call center industry in their jurisdictions (see London Eco-
nomic Development Corporation 2006). The growth of the outsourced call center 
sector also runs parallel with the increasing polarization of jobs and income in Can-
ada, and is encouraging a race to the bottom in terms of wages and working condi-
tions (Clott 2004; Larner 2002; Richardson and Belt 2001; Buchanan and Koch-
Schulte 2000). In 2005, Canadian call center workers earned on average Can$12.15 
per hour, substantially lower than the average Canadian wage of Can$18.50 
(Statistics Canada 2005).  OnCall is at the lower end with a starting wage of Can$9 
per hour. As research has shown, American corporations can save 35 percent on 
labor costs by outsourcing service work to call centers located in Canada (Canadian 
Customer Contact Center Industry 2004). And as the 2004 United Nations World 
Investment Report highlights, a substantial amount of outsourced and offshored 
business process and support services are being handled in Canada by call centers 
such as OnCall. In fact, Canada is among a group of advanced capitalist societies 
including Ireland and Israel that are attracting the bulk of offshored service work 
from the United States (Mosco 2005).  
 
 
The Theft of Time: neoliberalism, discourse, and power 
 
Neoliberal policies, developed and executed by corporate, state, and other institu-
tional powers, are fundamentally an assault on the working class, with capital bene-
fiting greatly from this encroachment on political economic relations. Neoliberal-
ism, then, “is the ideological expression of the reassertion of the dominance of fi-
nance” (Duménil and Lévy 2001, 579).  In this sense, time theft is based on the 
notion that time is a measurable commodity that can be allocated value. Workers 
have been accused of stealing almost everything from their employers, but the em-
phasis on the worker as a criminal as opposed to just slacking off or being lazy is 
relatively new. 
Developing along a similar trajectory, post-Fordist economic models are 
largely based on the rise of global competition, changing patterns of consumer 
tastes, “flexible specialization” (Vallas 1999), and the demands for new ICTs—
uncertain job prospects and insecurity are hallmarks of this system. Productivity 
and efficiency remain the important components in this new system of production, 
distribution, and consumption. Indeed, OnCall exemplifies such features, given its 
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status as an enterprise that markets itself as a leader in business process outsourc-
ing. Organizational change within the knowledge- and communication-based firm 
must be met with an equally impressive drive to substantially alter the cultural 
composition of particular companies and the industry as whole (see The Economist 
2006; Business Week 2005; Davenport 2005; Liker 2004). Consequently, corpora-
tions demand more work and longer hours out of fewer staff in even more precari-
ous employment circumstances. When the corporate community was complaining 
of the dangerous effects of counterproductive time theft, companies were simulta-
neously demanding more work out of existing workforces. Despite the major in-
creases in productivity and a rapidly growing economy over the past thirty years, 
the vast majority of Canadians during the same time period have seen no increase 
in real wages and those at the lowest end of the wage structure have experienced a 
decrease in real wages while corporate profits continue to rise (Russell and Dufour 
2007).  
Scholars of contemporary labor market conditions have also pointed to the rise 
of casualized and precarious employment within neoliberal and post-Fordist socio-
economic environments.  As one leading academic in the field points out, the cur-
rent employment regime which began in the 1970s is marked by atypical employ-
ment contracts, limited benefits and entitlements, low wages, more job insecurity, 
and increased risks to health (Vosko 2005).  Extremely restricted employee control 
over the labor process, working conditions, wages, and importantly for us here, 
pace of work, constitute one dimension of precarious employment (Vosko and Zu-
kewich 2005). Demands for “just-in-time” production, competitive and “flexible” 
labor markets provide employers with more freedom to regulate the working day as 
they see fit, and thus permit cutbacks in paid hours, benefits, and wages, and fosters 
a speed-up in production—in some cases only the enforcement of existing labor 
legislation prevents them from doing otherwise.  None of this, of course, is new to 
capitalism.  
 
Conceptualizing Employee Time-Theft, Deviance and Counterproductive Behavior 
 
The concept of time is a crucial point of departure.  For the notable Canadian 
writer, George Woodcock, “The clock represents an element of mechanical tyranny 
in the lives of modern [people] more potent than any individual exploiter or than 
any other machine” (Woodcock 1992, 105). In England during the eighteenth cen-
tury, when large parts of the peasantry were forced into industrializing urban cen-
ters as a consequence of the Acts of Enclosure, routinized time increased in signifi-
cance.  It is here that time began to become money, the employer’s money.  “In 
mature capitalist society”, E.P. Thompson wrote, “all time must be consumed, mar-
keted, put to use: it is offensive for the labor force merely to ‘pass the 
time’” (Thompson 1967, 90-91). The reconfiguration of capitalism that stemmed 
from the economic crises of the 1970s also resulted in an ideological shift involving 
both political and economic actors, which put additional pressure on the social 
sphere – the way work is done and the way life is ordered in fast-paced Western 
lives (Menzies 2005). 
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In the 1980s Robert Half (1983) concluded that time theft was “the deliberate 
abuse and waste of time on-the-job” and “usually unrecognised, unchecked, and 
unpunished” despite its cost to the economy.  “People who purposefully abuse their 
paid working time are stealing from their employers,” Half said, “just as they 
would be if they stole money or products” (cited in Boswell 1989). In 1985, Half’s 
survey calculated that the weekly time theft per employee in the US was 4 hours 
and 26 minutes, which amounted to roughly $1,924 a year (cited in Ottawa Citizen 
1985, B4). This alleged villainy also included the final fifteen minutes each day 
that employees prepared to leave the office (Scelsi 1988). Crucial to our focus on 
knowledge work, Half also estimated that the average office worker stole more 
time than the average manufacturing worker (Half 1983).   
Over the past two decades the definition of time theft has changed very little, 
and is often defined as: arriving for work late or leaving early (Kamp and Brooks 
1991); making personal telephone calls (Ottawa Citizen 1985); taking long lunches 
and coffee breaks (Kamp and Brooks 1991); working at a slow pace in order to 
create overtime (Ottawa Citizen 1985); leaving work to go shopping or run errands 
(Ford 1990); excessive socializing with other workers (Ottawa Citizen 1985); using 
company time and premises to conduct other business; arguing with customers 
(Snider 2002); faking illness and claiming unwarranted sick days (Hollinger and 
Clark 1983); falsifying time sheets (Snider 2002); sleeping on the job (Dickens, 
Katz, Land, and Summers 1989); working under the influence of alcohol and drugs 
(Kamp and Brooks 1991); as well as the unauthorized personal use of company e-
mail and Internet systems (Shaw 2005). In some instances scholars have con-
structed deviant archetypes that are prone to slack on the job and engage in theft 
(Hollinger and Clark 1983), while others have described theft at work as a form of 
resistance used by employees against management and employers (Mars 1982). 
Workplace deviance is not only defined as a form of material theft in the literature, 
but becomes broadly perceived as any attempt to subvert the prescripted labor proc-
ess by intentionally or unintentionally reducing productivity.           
Following Snider (2002) and Foucault (1980), we see the significance of truth 
claims as ideological claims to power in this public discourse. The construction of 
time theft as a behavior in need of discipline by management is grounded in a de-
liberate assault against the working class. In some cases employees adopt these 
claims as truth, or rather, accept the supposition that employers should have the 
right to ask of workers what they will based on the “legitimate” proprietary rela-
tions. Time at work then belongs to the employer. As critical scholars have long 
maintained, such social realities take on ideological forms that express certain ob-
jective relationships arising from the social relations of production (Pashukanis 
1978), with law serving a normalizing function (Foucault 1978).  There also per-
sists an overriding assumption that the profit-making activities of corporations are 
inherently good (Bittle and Snider 2006) and behaviors at work that do not contrib-
ute to this goal are broadly cast as deviant or criminal (see Sieh 2001, 81). Surveil-
lance techniques are deployed, and justified, largely on these grounds.  It must also 
be conceded that this ruling order is not maintained by force alone but by also win-
ning the active and passive consent of those over whom it rules (Gramsci 1971), 
namely the employees. Contemporary managerial rhetoric of emancipation and 
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empowerment, such as that presented by Davenport (2005), Hammer and Champy 
(2003), Hammer (1996) and others, obscures a deeper reality of work intensifica-
tion and increased managerial control (Sewell 1998). Indeed, the business-centred 
theories developed under the moniker of “knowledge management” involve the 
centralization of collectivized or shared knowledge, and are largely responses to 
organizations’ need to intensify the creation and appropriation of knowledge itself 
(Scarborough 2005). 
 
“If there’s time to lean, there’s time to clean”  
 
It was in the 1980s that time theft grabbed a remarkable amount of attention from 
the media as well as business and industry publications, even though there was 
nothing profoundly new about capitalist organizations rigorously controlling time 
in the workplace. What industry and journalist pundits clearly focused on was the 
alleged economic impact of employee theft in general, and time theft especially, in 
the midst of recession and mounting pressures from corporate lobbyists for more 
profitable and globally flexible economies and labor markets. The financial conse-
quences of time theft varied wildly and the accused travesty of employee crimes 
against the corporation and the economy, overall, were extremely spurious. It 
would seem, if one takes the figures at face value, that the economic woes of the 
time could ultimately be pinned on a workforce that was not only unproductive, but 
also largely criminal. But none of this developed in a political vacuum. In addition 
to the crisis of falling rates of profit experienced by Western firms and economies, 
the productivity squeeze and broad assaults on working class power took place un-
der the ascendancy of neoliberal governments and their ideological indebtedness to 
a supposedly laissez-faire capitalism. In the Anglo democracies, conservative and 
market-oriented governments cleared a path for reducing the strengths and gains 
made by organized labor over the past century. By displacing existing forms of 
social solidarity with that of entrepreneurial individualism, a moral and economic 
argument was constructed against hard-fought social programs and a sense of enti-
tlement to good working conditions, benefits, and pay by the working class. 
In 1982 it was argued that time theft cost the American economy $125 billion 
and by 1988 this figure sky-rocketed to $200 billion (Ratliff 1989; Towler 1988; 
Half 1983). According to the Conference Board of Canada, wasting time in the 
workplace was costing employers in Canada $15 billion in 1982 (Boswell 1989). 
From this it was concluded that workers were responsible for a quarter of overall 
business failures because of their long lunches and idle chat around the water 
cooler. As a reaction to these fears, the introduction of surveillance technologies 
and increased disciplinary measures (that is, dismissals) were emphasized as the 
means of removing counterproductive employees and activities from the workplace 
(Latshaw 1997; Scelsi 1988).  In a lucid point of clarity another writer stated, 
“Management increases profitability and maintains control of labor and benefit 
costs by preventing ‘time theft’” (Mancini 1994, 19). Punch clocks, a continuing 
reminder of industrialism’s rational ordering of the working day, and automated 
time and attendance systems are means of rationalizing the management of time 
through computerization and automation.  
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Despite the proponents of increased workplace surveillance as a response to 
time theft, the conceptualization of time theft as a crime committed by workers is 
not without its challengers, even amongst some academics within the ranks of busi-
ness schools.  Many of these critics have refuted the alleged consequences of em-
ployees not using every moment in the workplace to labor (Ratcliff 1989), with one 
writer calling Half’s research “half-baked” (Boswell 1989). Indeed, these argu-
ments also represent an acknowledgement that there are limits to how much can be 
demanded from employees before efficiency and worker morale suffer as a result of 
excessive time-discipline.  Not only do we find opposition to the alleged conse-
quences of workplace slacking, but also a thorough recognition of capital’s oppres-
sive deployment of time theft as a categorical vilification of employees who resist 
managerial control over the labor process. What is considered as theft by employ-
ees could be, and has been, considered as a response by workers to existing eco-
nomic inequities (Greenberg 1990).  
In summary, time theft emerged as a unique form of counterproductive behavior 
that quickly grabbed the attention of mainstream media from the early 1980s on-
wards. With the sophisticated development of ICTs, electronic monitoring and sur-
veillance devices, as well as bodies of science that seek to deploy these instru-
ments, managerial practice has in the process become more refined and precise. 
The next section will examine how the construction of time theft impacts the or-
ganization of call center work and charts workers’ responses to oppressive features 
of managerial control. 
 
 
Technology, Surveillance, and the  
OnCall Call Center Labor Process 
 
The technological surge over the last twenty-five years has given management new 
tools to aggressively thwart time theft among other forms of employee behavior 
perceived as deviant. Drawing on empirical evidence from a case study on a non-
unionized outsourced call center, this section examines technology and surveillance 
practices in relation to the regulation of time and control over the labor process. 
However, even with the development of more sophisticated surveillance technolo-
gies workers still find creative ways to resist management’s encroachment on the 
labor process by re-appropriating such things as time. Indeed, it is because of this 
resistance that disciplining employees’ use of time becomes an ongoing task. This 
section also confirms the conclusions reached by others that resistance is alive and 
well in the call center industry. Research has documented a wide range of worker 
resistance including using cynicism and humor to undermine managerial authority, 
faking telephone calls to avoid work, calling in pretending to be sick and other 
forms of truancy, walking out, and undertaking unionization drives (Mulholland 
2004; Taylor and Bain 2003; Fleming and Swell 2002; Callaghan and Thompson 
2001; Bain and Taylor 2000). 
Despite the ambivalent nature of technological systems, when technology is 
introduced into capitalist workplaces it is often wielded as a weapon of control. 
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There is a tendency for capital to deploy technology as a means to systematically 
subvert worker empowerment rather than to facilitate it (Marx 1976; Braverman 
1974). Indeed, manufacturers of workplace surveillance equipment highlight the 
time theft thwarting capabilities of their new technologies as a selling point (Marx 
1999). For example, the Abacus Group (n.d.), which describes itself as “Telecom 
Billing Experts,” notes the “seriousness” of “time theft” and contends that its Pro-
teus Communications Management System can eliminate, or at least reduce time 
theft. The company claims that the software it develops will “tell you which mem-
bers of the team are idling away their time” and “prevent fraudulent and abusive 
use of your phones and networks.”  Surveillance techniques, a crucial element of 
Taylorism, are complimented and re-invented by the introduction of new technol-
ogy.  
 
The Regulation of Time at OnCall 
 
The idea of time theft stems from Taylorist discourse, especially its concern with 
efficiency and productivity. Indeed, technologically-enabled surveillance tech-
niques are crucial elements of scientific management and of detecting and thwart-
ing time theft. Emphasizing the worker’s time as an object of surveillance and regu-
lation is reflected in the weekly statistical calculations of employee performance 
and behavior at OnCall. These reports indicate a strict adherence to break-times, 
punctual arrival and departure from work, attendance, average call handle time, 
percent of time spent entering customer details in accounts, the amount of idle time, 
and the number of calls taken in a particular span of time. As one employee, Bill, 
commented, “There is heavy monitoring everywhere. They [management] know 
when you sign in. They know how many calls you’ve had. They know your han-
dling time. They know when you have gone on breaks, and everything else.” The 
point is to document the entirety of the working day and with this, management has 
in its hands an exhaustive statistical computation of how each employee spends his 
or her day at work. Employees are enmeshed in an assemblage of calculative and 
calculating practices. Indeed, this exemplifies the preoccupation that management 
has with regulating time. Joe, another employee at OnCall, discussed the intensity 
of this monitoring. 
 
Your breaks are monitored; they [management] try to get people 
in the habit of being right on time with your breaks.  By the end 
of [our breaks], we were counting down to the second and punch-
ing in. As long as you are within in a minute of your fifteen min-
utes that’s fine. But if you were over a minute, [management] 
would be able to see that, and would indicate that to people, and 
make them sign things stating that they acknowledged that they 
[employees] went over their break. 
 
Employees are forced to officially acknowledge this by filling out statements de-
claring that they have caused a transgression against the employer. This information 
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is then included in the employee file and can be used to discipline workers in the 
present or at some point in the future. 
These comments on the meticulous accounting of seconds suggest that manage-
ment encourages workers to monitor, regulate, and shame themselves so that strict 
adherence to the schedule is maintained. Employees do internalize the monitoring 
process and see the notion of time theft as legitimate. Lucy, another employee at 
the call center, commented, “If you’re taking eighteen minute breaks everyday and 
you’re only supposed to be having fifteen minute breaks, you’re robbing the com-
pany.” This lucid statement also indicates an employee’s internalization of the ideo-
logically constructed, and legally sanctified notion of capital’s supremacy over la-
bor at work.  In workplaces such as call centers a variety of tactics are employed in 
an attempt to break the habits of employees that are undesirable to capital with the 
aim of crafting workers who are dependable and predictable with their use of time. 
Capitalism has consistently required a systematic restructuring of working habits. 
Break times are not to be based on the amount of rest that a worker might need, 
which would naturally fluctuate based on the circumstances and individual require-
ments.  Instead, it is the employer that dictates the break schedule, forcing workers 
to catch a moment’s rest at a time decided by management.  These changes in the 
natural cycle of rest necessitated a disciplinary regime, a process that is ongoing.  
Firing, disciplining, and belittling workers for time theft is quite prominent at 
OnCall, and exemplifies the punitive management style that is quite pervasive in 
this sector overall. At various points throughout the year, management goes on a 
mass-firing spree and uses the pretext of time theft as a reason for terminating em-
ployment. Jack, another employee at the call center, recounted these occurrences. 
His comments are especially illuminating. 
 
We call it the clean-up time where all of a sudden it seems as if 
management is looking for anything…The biggest thing for them 
is when they go on a cleaning binge, which is usually in the fall. 
They will start nailing people for taking an extra minute on their 
break or two minutes on lunch. 
 
In this workplace, as in many others, management policies are often enacted selec-
tively. Nonetheless, workers are expected to be at the workstation throughout the 
entire day, apart from the prescribed breaks. If workers need to leave they are re-
quired to ask their supervisors and sign out of their workstation.  Another em-
ployee, Frank, remarked, “If you have to go to the bathroom, and if it is not during 
one of your scheduled breaks, you’re supposed to inform your supervisor that 
you’re leaving your telephone to go to the bathroom…It really feels like I am in a 
kindergarten class.” Requiring workers to ask for permission to go to the washroom 
is not unique to OnCall and is seen by many workers as a part of the general de-
grading and dehumanizing working experience prevalent in many call centers (van 
den Broek 2004). Snider (2002, 103) notes that this has been referred to as 
“bathroom break harassment” and workers may hesitate to go to the washroom out 
of fear of being fired or otherwise disciplined.  And, as Linder (2002) points out, in 
10
Democratic Communiqué, Vol. 21 [2021], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/democratic-communique/vol21/iss2/3
a unionized workplace employers could not get away with banning or having such 
tight restrictions on toilet access. 
If workers leave their workstation too often during their shift apart from the 
allotted time, no matter what the reason, they can be disciplined.  It is common in 
call centers for workers to be written up, coached, and fired if they take too many 
breaks or spend too long on them (Head 2003; Rose 2002; Bain et al. 2002). Excep-
tional circumstances are not necessarily considered. For example, Elizabeth, an-
other worker at the call center, had more than reasonable grounds to leave her 
workstation often during the workday. She stated: 
 
When I was pregnant, I was leaving my computer four or five 
times a shift to go to the washroom, and I got coached on it. And 
I was like ‘Excuse me, I am pregnant, and when I have to go to 
the washroom, I am going regardless.’ They are very strict on 
things like that. 
 
These sorts of threats to productivity and efficiency become a concern for manage-
ment, with time spent urinating being considered as stolen time (Snider 2002). Tell-
ing pregnant women that they are going to the washroom too often is not an iso-
lated incident in the sector. Head (2003) reports on a call center in Arizona where a 
pregnant worker was also told by her supervisor that she was going to the wash-
room too frequently and that she should throw up in the garbage can next to her 
desk instead. In other call centers, employees are expected to make up the time for 
taking washroom breaks (Rose 2002). In such circumstances workers are deemed to 
be miscreants by employers, and are perceived to invariably commit offences 
against capital if aspects of their bodily functions are not controlled.   
While even employees in some unionized call centers have very tight toilet re-
strictions, the presence of a union can radically improve this access.  In the case of 
Faneuil, a 300-employer facility located in the US, workers won “freedom to go to 
the bathroom anytime” after they organized with the United Food and Commercial 
Workers (Linder 2002, 311-12). In this instance collective representation secured 
what may be considered a basic right—the right to go to the washroom.  The pres-
ence of this problem at other facilities indicates that unions must focus their orga-
nizing efforts on appealing to the processes of work and regulation of time as a 
significant part of their recruitment strategy.  Wages and benefits remain crucial of 
course, but allowing workers some autonomy at work is also vitally important. In-
deed, when some workers at OnCall attempted to organize—unsuccessfully be-
cause of the ruthless suppression of the union drive—the punitive management 
style was highlighted as one of the main motivating forces. Jack, who was active in 
the unionization attempt, explained, “I wanted [the union] in big time, just to stop 
the bullshit. I went to the union meetings, and we never once brought up pay. Not 
once, we just wanted the bullshit from management to stop.”  In non-unionized call 
centers workers are left with individual or informal means to resist aspects of the 
labor process. Some workers at this call center do want to undertake another union 
drive, but this has yet to occur. 
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Contested Terrain: Employee Resistance at OnCall  
 
As with other aspects of the labor process employees will, in one form or another, 
struggle against management’s attempt to control time. Indeed, employees can util-
ize the same technology that is required for the job to resist the pace of work at 
inbound call centers. Even though unions can greatly improve the work environ-
ment where they exist, there remain aspects of work that often cannot be negoti-
ated, which can breed a culture of discontent among employees. Another study has 
found individual and informal collective resistance similar to what we have discov-
ered occurring in a unionized context (Mulholland 2004). At OnCall, as in other 
call centers, individual and informal collective resistance arises out of the daily 
experience of work. The volume of calls can be quite high and employees must 
often take one call after another, which is both frustrating and exhausting. Judi, 
another worker at OnCall, complained:  
 
We had queues of three to four hundred people everyday. That’s 
hard to deal with. It can be stressful. You do not have time be-
tween calls to gather yourself.  If you had a difficult call and then 
you have to take another call, it is difficult sometimes to get it 
together.  
 
Employees will find ways to grab a moments rest, whether management gives it to 
them or not. Lucy, who has to a certain degree internalized the managerial concep-
tion of time theft, commented, “You got to say to yourself that you don’t care, and 
put yourself in wrap up for a bit or roll the queue, and take a little break and step 
away.” In some call centers workers have time in between calls to enter details or 
notes into the customers’ accounts, referred to at this call center as wrap time. To 
get a decent break between calls, workers can do what is known at this call center 
as the double wrap, which is hitting the wrap up button twice to extend the amount 
of time in between calls. If this is not done, workers will be thrown back into the 
queue and will have another call fired at them right away. If employees are not 
compensated with reasonable breaks they will resist and re-appropriate their time, 
especially if they feel cheated by the employer (Townsend 2003). The double wrap 
is an example of workers creatively employing the technology required to do the 
job in order to resist management’s constant emphasis on productivity and “proper” 
use of time. This also indicates the employees' propensity to shape the working 
environment into something bearable, and does not necessarily indicate an opposi-
tion to managerial authority or rules. Nonetheless, as new technologies are har-
nessed by management to control the labor process, new and innovative forms of 
worker resistance to these tools arise (Marx 1999).  
Management is aware of the double wrap and does consider this, explicitly, as 
time theft. As Lucy says, “You can sit there for a few minutes, but if it shows that 
you’re doing this an hour a day, it is obvious that you’re goofing off.”  To resist, 
workers at this call center, as in others, need to know how long they can extend the 
time not taking calls before management considers it as worthy of disciplinary ac-
tion (Callaghan and Thompson 2001). It is a delicate game that workers must play 
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if they are to make the workplace a somewhat bearable environment.  If this form 
of resistance is identified by management and deemed a transgression against capi-
tal, workers may face the threat of having their employment terminated. 
Workers at OnCall use other methods to grab a few moments reprise for them-
selves during the workday including rolling the queue, which is similar to the dou-
ble wrap. Joe explained: 
 
There are ways that you can avoid doing some work. It is called 
‘rolling the queue.’ You have an available button, and you got an 
outside line. So if you are in available and hit the outside line, say 
if you just finished a call, you are going to be the last person in 
the queue to expect the next call, and as calls come in it is going 
to move closer to you; so if you hit outside line and then hit avail-
able again, you have bumped yourself to the back of the line 
again.  
 
However, like the double wrap there are limits to rolling the queue. Time spent 
rolling can be monitored as well, and workers are disciplined if they perform this 
tactic to the point that management sees it as impacting productivity. But explicitly 
coercive practices are not the only means used to discipline workers. Peer pressure, 
which is an aspect of normative control, also limits the amount of time workers 
spend rolling the queue. “I could sit there all day and roll the queue and not take 
one call,” Lucy commented, “but my poor buddy beside me is panicking, taking a 
hundred calls.” This form of collegial concern among employees can be used to the 
advantage of management to subvert worker resistance. Employees can and do fid-
dle with the technological systems to get some free time. However, they realize that 
if they do this it means more work for their colleagues (Brannan 2005). If workers 
do not avoid doing work so that they do not overburden their co-workers, manage-
ment is likely to foster this sort of sentiment, and it is a reason to put employees 
who do very individualized work into otherwise arbitrary teams. Indeed, some have 
argued that call centers agents can be more effectively exploited and controlled by 
management when working in such groups (Van den Broek et al. 2004; Mulholland 
2002). In the end management gets what it wants: hardworking and productive 
workers. 
Employees are aware of the limits that they can push when it comes to grabbing 
a few moments for themselves between calls, and have to maintain constant vigi-
lance if they are to successfully manipulate the prescripted labor process. As Jack 
explained:   
 
If you hit the double wrap, you can sit there indefinitely, but if 
you’re not paying attention, all of a sudden a team leader will 
come down and say ‘You’ve been in wrap-up for ten minutes, 
what are you doing?’ And it is like, ‘Oops, sorry.’  
 
Employees in this call center have had their employment terminated when deter-
mined by management to have committed an offence against capital. Employees 
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have to use the double wrap and rolling the queue methods sparingly, if they do not 
want to be fired or otherwise disciplined. But management at OnCall uses other 
methods beyond the threat of dismissal, to bring out labor's full productive capaci-
ties. As Judi noted, “If you are rolling the queue they can tell. They can also push 
me back into the queue…The supervisor can just hit a button and throw you back in 
the queue.” As soon as the worker is back in the queue, the calls are forced fed to 
him or her again. This is an example of what Edwards (1979) referred to as a form 
of direct and technical control, both of which are used to thwart time theft. As with 
most workplaces, a plethora of techniques are deployed by management to enforce 
control over the labor process and workers themselves.  
Even though call centers are often touted as high-tech and professional working 
environments, like that espoused in Daniel Bell's (1973/1999) vision of post-
industrial workplaces, the use of ICTs is tightly regulated. Lucy commented on this 
stringent control: 
 
They took away internet privileges other than specific sites that 
were to do with our jobs. IT had us blocked out of everything. 
You weren’t able to use [Microsoft Messenger]. They blocked 
most things out. IT can get at anything and see what you’re do-
ing, like any Internet system. They took away emailing and being 
able to go out freely on the Internet. There was no way to surf the 
net. 
 
Through the use of filtering software, Internet activity is restricted to business re-
lated websites and e-mail is only available for work-related purposes. Anything sent 
over the corporation’s communications network is subject to surveillance. Again, 
technology is used to restrict labor’s capacity for time theft by virtually eliminating 
the possibility of engaging in acts of personal recreation on company computer 
systems. 
When workers re-appropriate their time it is considered a criminal offence 
against capital. However, when management steals employees’ time, such as ex-
pecting them to do extra work for no pay, the discourse changes. As Snider notes, 
“Theft of time by employers…is neither disciplined nor criminalized” (2002, 109), 
especially in non-unionized environments. Employees are expected to do extra 
work to increase their own productivity and efficiency. However, they will resist 
this imposition on their own free time. Frank commented:  
 
We’re supposed to come in ten or fifteen minutes early to get our 
computer set up and open up all of our computer programs, and 
then sign on to our phones, and then that is when we start getting 
paid. But if I start at 10:30, I’ll sign into my phone at 10:30, and 
then I turn on my computer. It is not as if I enjoy booting up the 
computer. It is not a hobby of mine that I do for fun. If I have to 
come in to boot up the computer I am going to get paid for that. 
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Workers are not allowed to take an extra minute or two on their breaks or lunches, 
but management expects workers to give up their own free time to contribute to 
corporate profitability and efficiency, thus lengthening the working day without 
additional remuneration. Frank’s comments echo Braverman’s assertion that “in a 
society where labor power is purchased and sold, working time becomes sharply 
and antagonistically divided from non-working time, and the worker places an ex-
traordinary value upon this ‘free’ time, while on-the-job time is regarded as lost or 
wasted” (1974, 278).  Employees are expected to be productive even before they 
are officially on the clock by preparing the workstation in advance.  Without the 
collective power of a union there is little formal recourse for workers to challenge 
this rule. Employers insist the time spent at work is time spent being fully produc-
tive while at the same time continually encroaching on employees’ free time, as 
Ehrenreich (2002) has observed, which is, not surprisingly, valued much more than 





With the emergence of industrial capitalism, the organization of work became in-
creasingly structured by the rigours and discipline of time. The construction and 
regulation of time should be understood as a political economic process. This is 
evident with the emergence of time theft as part of the neoliberal vocabulary, con-
structed largely by ideological claims reified in the industry and business press. At 
the same time, management theory has been used to articulate more “rational” and 
scientific measures to control the productive capacity of knowledge and communi-
cation workers in post-industrial workplaces. Just as industrialization redefined the 
working day, so too has the corporate-led and state-supported project of neoliberal-
ism restructured the labor process to underline the pressures for short-term capital 
accumulation; productivity and efficiency and how an employee spends his or her 
time at work remain incessant preoccupations for management.  
As this article has argued, time theft has become a serious concern for capital 
and management in the information, communication and knowledge industries in 
general, and the call center sector particularly. Part of the disciplining of the work-
force in call centers is accomplished by constructing the concept of time theft as an 
emerging form of workplace deviance, almost entirely outside historical or eco-
nomic contexts. The strict regulations on how office employees spend their time 
while at work coincides with the development of routinized and regimented labor 
processes in this industry. Indeed, as many have argued, call center work retains 
many of the general characteristics of Taylorism as a management practice, espe-
cially Taylor’s determination to eliminate any sort of waste in the labor process as 
well as revoking worker autonomy over the performance of tasks at work. 
The managerial practice of eliminating what it deems as wasteful time has been 
intensified. As we have seen, the measurement and management of time is quite 
meticulous. The demand on workers to always be productive and highly efficient in 
the context of a competitive global economy has led to increased surveillance of the 
labor process, which has negative ramifications for employees’ physical and mental 
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well-being (Zweig 2005). Advances in information and communication technolo-
gies, especially their capacity for surveillance, gives management the opportunity 
to monitor and thereby exercise more detailed control over the labor process—an 
opportunity that management has eagerly seized. Information and communication 
technologies have become a powerful—but not a determining force—in advanced 
capitalist workplaces. In call centers such as OnCall we see the tendency of capital 
to present a systematic assault on worker autonomy and empowerment through 
these advanced technological systems. 
Yet even with these advances, managerial surveillance practices have yet to 
accomplish the omnipresence envisioned by Bentham’s notion of the Panopticon. A 
workplace is not a total institution. As has been documented in numerous studies 
including this one, worker resistance to management practices continually arises; 
the organization of work and the disciplinary management of time are not going 
unchallenged. New forms of managerial control are often met with innovative 
forms of worker resistance, such as those charted in this article.  But the task at 
hand for workers remains daunting. Despite the gains made by individualized acts 
of resistance that make work somewhat tolerable, collective resistance is the main-
stay for making far-reaching changes in the sector. But in Canada, organized labor 
has been unwilling or, in some cases, unsuccessful at making electronic surveil-
lance a central bargaining issue (Kiss and Mosco 2005; Bryant 1995). This is not to 
say that the matter is of peripheral importance, quite the opposite.  Some rightly 
believe that surveillance needs to be addressed in the larger political sphere, and not 
in collective bargaining. Yet the global Union Network International (UNI) has 
identified workplace surveillance as a sight for opposition, and recently published a 
policy paper on the topic (Union Network International 2006a and 2006b). 
Further to the topic of unionization, while there is an abundance of literature—
both academic and union-based—looking at how unionization has impacted the 
labor process, levels of workplace surveillance, and managerial authority in union-
ized call centers, there is far less work that strenuously discusses the successful and 
unsuccessful strategies for union organizing. We have shown earlier that unions 
have been proven to make gains for employees, such as the right to use the wash-
room (Linder 2002).  But when we look at the larger picture, with specific refer-
ence here to the recently released Global Call Center Report (Holman, Batt, and 
Holtgrewe 2007) a more impressive image appears.  Call centers in countries with 
higher union density rates (i.e., Germany, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Aus-
tria, etc.) have been shown to exhibit higher job quality, lower turnover rates, and 
lower wage dispersions than centers located in liberal market economies such as 
Canada and the US.  Furthermore, as the Report’s authors point out, the intensity of 
workplace monitoring is less, and job discretion is relatively higher, in economies 
and call centers where unionization is prevalent.  Union contracts in call center fa-
cilities in Canada have also resulted in paid breaks, paid and unpaid leaves, sched-
uled vacations, and enhanced job security (Guard 2003). This evidence suggests 
that there is indeed reason for both greater call center unionism and labor regula-
tions that favor employees more so than business. 
What we have argued, building upon existing scholarly work, is that collective 
resistance in knowledge- and communication-based workplaces must increasingly 
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target managerial surveillance techniques and encroachments on employee privacy 
as sites of opposition. Even though informal, localized, and individual forms of 
resistance can alter the landscape of work slightly to make it more bearable for em-
ployees, widespread change needs collective action on a national and, perhaps even 
more so, international scale.  What is more, future research on the theft of time de-
mands a global perspective so that the complexities of an international division of 
labor in the call center industry can be more fully understood. Just as the rapid as-
sent of industrialization had dramatic consequences for the European population 
and their existing rhythm of time, the specificity of these tendencies within knowl-
edge and communication-based firms located beyond the West must be examined in 
greater depth. And while this article only touched upon the active complicity of 
software and technology firms in the conceptualization and actual policing of time 
theft, much more needs to be done to understand the political economic scope of 
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